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Abstract  
In this discussion, I put forward a hypothesis on social bigotry that appears at first to be 
counterintuitive, but which is supported by a very simple and compelling analysis. From that 
analysis, we will discover that bigotry and other negative social behaviours such as racism, 
homophobia, bullying etc., are driven by the same inherent human passion that makes sociality 
possible. The virtue or vice of that passion is therefore dependent upon the circumstance of its 
expression.  
Introduction  
The modern era is characterized by a crescendo of change from tribal societies to cosmopolitan 
societies. However, the social instincts of the individual, being ingrained in our biology, cannot 
change at that rapid pace, and therefore tend to lag behind. Consequently, there tends to be a 
lapse between the social psychology of the modern human and his/her current social reality. The 
residual tribal instincts from the tribal past of today’s cosmopolitan human manifest in modern 
social problems such as bigotry, racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, bullying etc. Consequently, 
the prevalence of these attitudes tends to correlate strongly with the conservatism of a society.   
The efforts to explain the evolution of social and moral behaviour often focus exclusively 
on the positive social and moral traits, or the prosocial traits (in the parlance of evolutionary 
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biology). In this paper, I will explore the evolutionary psychology of the negative social/moral 
behaviours such has bigotry, racism, homophobia and bullying, whose evolutionary basis is a 
subject that scholars have generally not deemed worthwhile to investigate. In fact, it is only by 
serendipity that that aspect of social behaviour caught my interest.  It was in the process of 
modeling the evolution of the pro-social traits, upon empathy as foundation, that it struck me that 
many of the “negative” social attitudes, such as bigotry, racism homophobia and bullying, are 
actually variant manifestations of the same instinct that drives social behaviour and which enable 
the formation of social groups.  
Here is the conundrum: the idea of forming a group within a population or species 
involves the dual process of inclusion and exclusion. For, there is really no group if there is no 
distinction between who is in and who is out. This necessarily entails some criterion for picking 
out those within, from those without. Sensitivity to the most effective criteria for discriminating 
between group members and non-members would correlate positively with the formation of 
durable groups, and will therefore tend to be favoured by natural selection.  It is this 
discriminatory component of social behaviour that becomes problematic for contemporary 
cosmopolitan societies.  
Analysis 
Under current Darwinian modeling of social evolution, we suppose selfishness to the original 
constitution of human nature from which sociality evolves. By that scheme, the negative and 
abhorrent social behaviours such as those I have cited above are blindsided. What is their origin? 
One thing that is quite apparent is that they are not selfish behaviour. They are also not strictly 
anti-social. In fact they are always motivated by a passion to protect a group or a society from a 
perceived threat from individuals of alien behaviour, culture, race or ethnicity. So if anything at 
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all, they are hyper-group or hyper-social behaviour. Consequently, I refer to that suite of 
behaviours – bigotry, racism, patriarchy, homophobia, bullying etc. - by the term hyper-social 
behaviour or hyper-sociality. Thus an unpleasant paradoxical reality emerges from this research, 
and it is that abhorrent social attitudes, such as bigotry, homophobia, racism and bullying are 
expressions of the same trait that drives the formation of social groups and by the same passion 
that sends a social being to war, and inspiring in him/her the willingness to kill and to die for 
group or country. Therefore, it is only time, place and circumstance that separate the virtue of 
that passion from its vice. If policy makers have this proper understanding of the nature and 
evolutionary basis of such hyper-social attitudes, they would be better equipped to devise more 
effective policies to combat them. 
My hypothesis, is inspired largely by insights from moral philosophy, particularly, the 
philosopher David Hume, who gives a very compelling analysis of sociality and morality in his 
Treatise of Human Nature. The aspects of Hume’s moral views that I use are corroborated by 
other eminent philosophers and scholars such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau, Darwin and Freud. 
There is also empirical evidence from contemporary research in social neuropsychology, which 
strongly corroborates Hume’s view that emotion forms the basis of morality (Bloom 2010; Haidt 
2007; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Zanjoc 1980; Wilhelm Wundt 1907). 
Hume (1740) asserts sympathy (actually empathy in today’s parlance) to be central to the 
evolution of social and moral behaviour. He refers to empathy as a natural passion, and describes 
it as characteristically partial, in that it is directed towards family members to the exclusion of 
non-family members. Hume adds however, that even though empathy by nature dwells within 
the family, it can be extended to other members of the society when the individual discovers 
through education and experience, the immense benefit he/she draws from his/her social group. 
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The basis of bigotry is what a person perceives the perimeter of his/her social group to be. We 
shall see how, later in this discussion. 
In building his moral theory, (Darwin 1871) also asserted this in-group confinement of 
empathy, and cited anthropological studies that suggest that members of primitive tribal societies 
were quite indifferent to the misfortunes of individuals who were outside their tribe. But Darwin 
and the anthropologists of his day did not have to look for the clearest evidence of this 
confinement of empathy in “primitive tribal societies.” Members of the most civilized societies 
today exhibit this all the time. For example, in early January of 2015 a major snow storm alert 
was issued for the north-eastern USA and parts of Canada. It was a great inconvenience to many 
people in the affected regions but nobody died. At the same time, in Malawi, floods triggered by 
weeks of heavy rains affected more than 1 million people, displaced more than 300,000, killed 
276 and injured more than 600, according to the U.N. Disaster Assessment and Coordination 
(UNDAC) unit. While every news channel in North America reported the snow storm alert, not a 
single one of them mentioned the disaster in Malawi. In fact media watchers observed that the 
BBC was the only Western media outlet to report the Malawi disaster.  
Beyond this inherent disinterest regarding the plight of individuals outside our own 
group, Freud (1930) notes that there is an innate tendency for aggression towards the outsider, 
even though he assigns a different source to it. Freud suggests that humans have an innate “cruel 
aggressiveness” that disturbs the relationship between neighbours, and threatens the 
disintegration of society. One outlet for this innate aggressiveness is hostility against outsider. 
Freud notes that as long as there is some individual or group that can be perceived us the outside 
other, the aggressiveness may be directed away from group members and towards the outsider. 
Freud writes: “It is always possible to bind together considerable number of people in in love, so 
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long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggression” (1930, 
98).  Freud suggests that this is the source of strife between communities that occupy adjoining 
territories. According to this hypothesis, cohesion between members of a group becomes easier 
once an external avenue is found for the discharge of the instinctual aggression of the members. 
Freud cites the Jewish people who now scatter around the world as often situated to receive the 
aggression (1930, 99). This work of Freud was written before the Nazis came to power in 
Germany, yet he talked of the Jews as frequent targets of aggression. In fact, anti-Semitism was 
quite rampant even in the countries that allied to fight the Nazis. The hyper-sociality hypothesis 
that I propose here may explain the basis of the prevalence of anti-Semitism. It is simply that 
Jews are a small distinct minority wherever they live (other than in modern day Israel). Thus 
they are often situated to be the target of the inherent discrimination and hostility of the social 
being (humans in this case) against the outsider. Every minority group in every society is subject 
to the inherent discrimination and hostility of humans as social beings. 
This exclusionist and egoistic character of social groups has also been expressed in 
contemporary thought. Zwick and Fletcher (2014. 103) assert that “group solidarity often 
promotes aggression towards outsiders,” as does Koestler (1967), who notes that “The egoism of 
the group feeds on the altruism of its members.” This stems from the group-centered tendency of 
altruism. In other words, the altruism of individuals results in a self-interested group, and this can 
have unpleasant consequences for individuals outside the group. As such, inter-group conflict 
has been a regular feature of human social history. As Zwick and Fletcher (2014, 103) note 
further, “the evils of human history may be due more to the tendency towards integration than 
towards self-assertion.” Freud and Darwin, like Hume, also held that this “family confined” 
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empathy has the capacity, given certain conditions, to transcend the family boundary to bigger 
and bigger groups.  
In fact, the natural instinct or social instinct that manifest in empathy for one’s group of 
affiliation, and indifference or even hostility towards individuals outside the group arose deep in 
man’s evolutionary lineage, and is most vividly exhibited in social mammals. In wolf packs and 
lion prides for example, the group territory is vigilantly guarded against intrusion by non-
members, and even those who want to join the group have a hard time getting accepted. We see 
this instinctive aggression towards intruders expressed to varying degrees by our domestic dogs 
when strangers visit our homes.  
Inter-group conflict is a feature of all social species. In fact Brown et al. (2015) reports 
that over a hundred species of flies have been identified that carve a living solely out of 
decapitating and consuming the head contents of injured ants. Brown et al. reports some of these 
ant decapitating flies to be the most abundant fly species in some habitats and all the abundant 
food supply of injured ants comes from inter-colony violence. 
Thus, aggression towards individuals outside the groups appears to be concomitant with 
sociality. But how does this come about? The strong in-group bias (or confined empathy as 
Hume would call it) has enabled humans to form strong and stable tribal groups which have 
ensured their survival in the natural environment to which they are otherwise individually ill-
adapted (Hume 1740). In fact, if empathy (in fact, call it the social instinct) were not sensitive to 
group markers, social groups could not be formed. An organism that is not capable of feeling any 
special bond or affiliation with particular individuals would not be capable of forming a social 
group or belonging to one, and would for all intents and purposes be an asocial organism.  
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It seems then that the social instinct necessarily has to be discriminatory, for the 
formation of social groups to be possible. In fact, Kurzban et al (2001, 15387) have cited 
numerous studies, in addition to their own, that suggest the existence of a cognitive machinery 
that has evolved to detect coalitional alliances.  This in fact is now a very prevalent feature of 
modern revolutionary models of sociality/morality - in what is called “conditional altruism,” 
where the only kind of altruism that can possibly evolve is one that is selective on the basis of 
reciprocity, kinship and group affiliation.  
Evolutionary biologists have long noted that natural selection does not allow for the 
evolution cooperative and altruistic traits within populations (Wilson and Wilson 2007; Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman 1978; Hamilton 1964). Thus, for cooperative social groups to evolve, the 
altruistic expression must be contingent on certain factors, rather than being automatic. What has 
been suggested by evolutionary biologist include: (1) Altruists associating exclusively with other 
altruists (Maynard-Smith 1998; Sober and Wilson 1998). This means that groups that are formed 
must consist of like-minded individuals in terms of willingness to cooperate and help other 
members of the group. (2) Conditional deployment of the altruistic behavior, i.e., only towards: 
(a) genetic relatives (Hamilton 1964), since they are more likely to also carry the altruistic gene 
(b) or towards other altruists through reciprocity (Trivers 1971).  
All these suggest the need for a sociality trait, if it is to be evolutionarily stable, to be 
discriminatory between individuals. However, the discrimination cannot be effective unless there 
is a reliable basis for distinguishing between those individuals to favour and those to disfavour. 
That is why Dawkins (1976/1989, p. 89) used the “Greenbeard” metaphor to suggest a clear and 
obvious basis for discrimination. Thus, the capacity to discriminate in the dispensation of 
altruism is necessary for the sustainability of altruism/sociality itself. 
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The idea of the group “Canada,” for example would be meaningless if there are no 
criteria for discrimination between who is and who is not Canadian and on the basis of which 
privileges will be preferentially conferred or denied. Canada as a society provides, for example, 
conspicuously more generous healthcare, education and welfare to Canadians than it does to non-
Canadians inside and outside Canada. That is the discriminatory, but necessary aspect of 
sociality. There is the popular sentiment among Canadians that they are characteristically polite. 
They also hold Canada to be the best country in the world to live. Every social group, and in fact, 
the citizens of every modern state see themselves as special in some way. That is the bigoted 
feature of sociality. Ghanaians for example feel generally that they are distinguished by their 
hospitality and Americans see their country as the vanguard for freedom and democracy around 
the world.  These bigoted views play a role in sustaining the group by giving members a 
worthwhile reason to belong. If so, why do we generally view them as undesirable? Again, it is 
based on time, place and circumstance. In modern racially and ethnically mixed societies like 
Canada, a situation of “groups within group” exists, which creates an opportunity for conflict in 
group identity. It would be interesting then, to explore the psychological factors that underlie the 
useful and harmful expressions of the social instinct.  
In his book, Against Fairness, Asma (2012), has attempted to use the evolutionary 
significance of this inherent group bias to argue for mitigation in our current social 
disapprobation of favouritism and nepotism. However, we expect humans, who we credit with 
advanced rationality and self-command, to be more discerning of when the display of such 
primal instincts is appropriate. It is when, for whatever reason, an individual fails to properly 
align these group/tribal instincts with his existing social reality that they (the instincts) manifest 
in such vicious forms as racism, homophobia, bullying etc. In other social contexts however, 
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especially in the small tribal societies of man’s past, such attitudes can be quite proper and useful 
for the protection and maintenance of the group or tribe.  
Reed & Aquino (2003) suggest “a self-regulating construct referred to as moral identity 
that connects the individual (personal identity) to others (social identity) through the evaluative 
implications of a set of moral associations that define the moral self.” We should expect then, 
that it is when this proposed “moral identity” regulating system is functioning improperly in an 
individual that he/she overplays subgroup passions in a major group. Such major groups are 
largely the nation states of today, which are actually artificial constructs that consist of several of 
these natural groups cobbled together as units of political administration. However, for over 95 
percent human social existence, the natural fault lines for the boundaries of empathy have been 
kinship and tribe, and the social groups were quite homogeneous, racially, linguistically, 
culturally and belief system. The ideal of modern cosmopolitan societies is to see these natural 
boundaries of empathy drastically diminished within their national borders.   
My on-going research explores how such subgroup or tribal group traits such as 
homophobia and bullying could have fostered group strength and stability in tribal societies. To 
explain briefly here, in early human societies, where intergroup conflict was common, and 
weapon technologies for fighting wars and hunting big game was quite rudimentary, group 
strength was determined largely by group size and the physical strength of individual members. 
Under such circumstances, such societies would have evolved social instincts that valued 
procreation (which was the surest way to increase their numbers) as well as physically powerful 
individuals. As such, any conduct that would appear to undermine procreation within the group 
would be suppressed. A homosexual tendency in those times would have been perceived as such. 
Similarly, the premium on physical power possibly formed the basis of patriarchy and bullying. 
10 
 
As I have stated in my introduction however, modern cosmopolitan societies, as well as modern 
technology have evolved at such a rapid pace that there has not been sufficient time for these 
tribal instincts to be shed. They are still in the deep psyche of the modern human. However, like 
many of our other primal instincts, we ought to be able to control these through education, 
rationality and self-command.  
To conclude, bigotry and the other hyper-social behaviours are not intrinsically bad. As a 
matter of fact, they are the very features of humanity that make sociality and citizenship possible. 
They become a problem for cosmopolitan societies. We evolved adaptations to live in small 
social groups and we have done so for the past ninety-nine percent of our existence as humans. 
Modern cosmopolitan societies are only hundreds of years old and require behaviour contrary to 
our biological wiring. Through education and training, we can always overcome biology. But we 
need to understand the true nature of the problem in order to resolve it. 
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